Caveat

No, I do NOT practice law. No I do NOT have a law degree. No, this paper does NOT offer any legal advice.

This paper examines the Absolute and Non-Derogable Rights of an Australian Citizen.

Everything is referenced and I utilised three fact checking services hoping I could prove my own depressing conclusion wrong. If I am wrong, please, someone prove me wrong ASAP.

Executive Summary

The constitutional architecture of the Commonwealth of Australia presents a distinct anomaly in the landscape of modern Western democracies. Unlike the United States, which enshrines a catalogue of “inalienable” rights in its Bill of Rights, or Canada, which entrenched the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, Australia maintains a system of governance rooted fundamentally in the British tradition of Parliamentary Sovereignty, tempered by a federal written constitution (Human Rights Law Centre, 2023; Rule of Law Education Centre, 2023). This structural choice has profound implications for the concept of “absolute” and “non-derogable” rights.

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal status of rights within the Australian constitutional framework. Drawing upon the text of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp), over a century of High Court of Australia jurisprudence, and relevant international legal principles, this document scrutinizes the specific claims of “absolutism” often attributed to sections 92, 80, 116, 117, and 51(xxxi).

The analysis reveals that the Australian Constitution does not confer absolute personal rights in the jurisprudential sense. The phrase “absolutely free” in section 92 has been judicially interpreted to allow for proportionate regulation (Cole v Whitfield, 1988). The “non-derogable” rights recognized in international law—such as freedom from arbitrary detention—have been held to be derogable by clear legislative intent in the domestic sphere, most notably in Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004).

However, the report identifies a critical distinction: while substantive human rights (speech, movement, property) are generally qualified and derogable, procedural or jurisdictional rights—specifically the right to seek judicial review of government action under section 75(v)—have emerged as the single “entrenched minimum” that the Parliament cannot remove. This jurisdictional guarantee, rather than any textual “Bill of Rights,” constitutes the true absolute in Australian law (Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth, 2003).

Part I: Conceptual Foundations of Australian Rights

To accurately assess the existence of absolute rights in Australia, first we must dismantle the conflation between “rights” as understood in international or natural law, and “rights” as recognized by the Australian High Court. The divergence between these concepts is the source of significant public misconception and legal conflict.

1.1 The Rejection of the “Bill of Rights” Model

The framers of the Australian Constitution deliberately rejected the United States model of a comprehensive Bill of Rights during the Convention Debates of the 1890s. This decision was not an oversight but a calculated reliance on the Westminster system of “Responsible Government” and the common law (Rule of Law Education Centre, 2023).

Sir Owen Dixon, one of Australia’s most preeminent jurists, famously noted that the Constitution is not a document concerned with the protection of individual liberty against the state, but rather an instrument of government meant to distribute sovereign power between the Commonwealth and the States (Parliamentary Education Office, n.d.). Consequently, where rights appear in the Constitution, they are typically framed not as positive entitlements vested in the individual (e.g., “The people shall have the right to...”), but as negative restrictions on legislative power (e.g., “The Commonwealth shall not make any law...”) (Krygger v Williams, 1912).

This distinction is legally operative. A limitation on power is contingent on the scope of the power itself. If the power expands—for example, the Defence Power (s 51(vi)) during wartime—the limitation may recede, rendering the so-called “right” elastic rather than absolute.

1.2 Defining the Terminology: Absolute vs. Non-Derogable

In precise legal terms, the query demands an investigation into two distinct categories of rights.

Absolute Rights:

An absolute right is one that admits no exceptions, balances, or limitations. It applies in all circumstances, regardless of the competing public interest.

• Global Context: In international law, the prohibition against torture (Article 7, ICCPR) is often cited as absolute (Attorney-General’s Department, n.d.).

• Australian Context: As this report will demonstrate, the High Court has consistently ruled that no substantive right in the Australian Constitution is absolute. Even where the text uses the word “absolute” (as in s 92), the Court has read in qualifications to allow for an ordered society (Palmer v Western Australia, 2021).

Non-Derogable Rights:

The term “non-derogable” is a term of art in International Human Rights Law, specifically Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It refers to rights that cannot be suspended (derogated from) even during a “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” (Attorney-General’s Department, n.d.).

• List of ICCPR Non-Derogable Rights: Right to Life (Art 6); Freedom from Torture (Art 7); Freedom from Slavery (Art 8); Freedom from Retrospective Criminal Law (Art 15); Freedom of Thought/Conscience (Art 18).

• Australian Reality: Australia is a “dualist” legal system. International treaties do not have the force of law unless enacted by domestic legislation. The Australian Constitution contains no “non-derogation” clause. Therefore, rights that are non-derogable in international law (like freedom from arbitrary detention) are fully derogable in Australian domestic law if the Parliament expresses a clear intent to do so (Al-Kateb v Godwin, 2004).

1.3 The “Partial” Constitutional Guarantees

Scholars describe the Australian Constitution as containing a “partial” or “scattered” Bill of Rights (Stephenson, 2020). These are specific provisions that look like human rights but function as federal checkpoints. The following sections provide an exhaustive analysis of these provisions, testing each against the threshold of “absolutism.”

Part II: The Express Rights – Textual Promises and Judicial Realities

The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 outlines the structure of the Constitution. Within this structure, five specific sections are frequently cited as protecting rights. A detailed jurisprudential analysis reveals that none of these sections creates an absolute right.

2.1 Section 92: The Paradox of “Absolutely Free”

Section 92 of the Constitution provides:

“On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free.” (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 92).

This section contains the strongest textual claim to absolutism in the entire document. The interpretation of the phrase “absolutely free” has plagued the High Court for over a century, evolving from a doctrine of individual rights to a doctrine of free markets, and finally to a doctrine of proportionality.

2.1.1 The Rise and Fall of the “Individual Right” Theory

In the mid-20th century, particularly under the influence of the Bank Nationalisation Case (1948), section 92 was viewed as a guarantee of the individual’s right to engage in trade without government interference (Stellios, 2010). This “laissez-faire” interpretation allowed businesses to challenge regulations on transport, marketing boards, and banking.

However, this view led to legal chaos, as it theoretically invalidated necessary regulations (like safety standards for interstate trucks). If trade must be “absolutely free,” how can a state impose speed limits on interstate trucks?

2.1.2 The Cole v Whitfield Revolution (1988)

In the landmark decision of Cole v Whitfield (1988), the High Court unanimously abandoned the individual rights theory. The Court examined the historical intention of the framers and concluded that the purpose of s 92 was to create a common market, not to immunize individuals from regulation.

• The Test: Section 92 guarantees freedom from discriminatory protectionism.

• Application: A law will violate s 92 only if it imposes a discriminatory burden on interstate trade and that burden is protectionist in character.

• The Case: Tasmania banned the possession of undersized crayfish. Mr. Whitfield, a crayfish trader, imported undersized crayfish from South Australia (where they were legal). He argued the Tasmanian law breached his “absolute” freedom of trade. The High Court disagreed. The law applied to all crayfish (Tasmanian and imported) and had a conservation purpose, not a protectionist one. Therefore, the “absolute” freedom was validly restricted by the conservation law (Cole v Whitfield, 1988).

2.1.3 Palmer v Western Australia: Freedom of Intercourse

The “intercourse” limb of s 92 protects the movement of people. In 2020-2021, this was tested when Western Australia closed its borders to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Clive Palmer challenged this, arguing that s 92 created an absolute right for Australians to cross state borders (Palmer v Western Australia, 2021).

In Palmer v Western Australia (2021), the High Court definitively rejected the absolutist argument. The Court held that the freedom of intercourse is not absolute. It is subject to a test of structured proportionality (Gordon J).

A law restricting border movement is valid if:

1. Legitimate Purpose: It pursues a legitimate non-discriminatory purpose (e.g., public health protection).

2. Suitability: The law is rationally connected to that purpose.

3. Necessity: There are no obvious, compelling alternatives that are less restrictive.

4. Adequacy in Balance: The importance of the purpose outweighs the extent of the restriction.

Conclusion on s 92: The word “absolute” in the Constitution does not mean absolute. It means “subject to reasonable and proportionate regulation for a legitimate state purpose.”

2.2 Section 51(xxxi): Property Rights and “Just Terms”

Section 51(xxxi) empowers the Commonwealth to make laws for the “acquisition of property on just terms” (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 51(xxxi)). This is often viewed as a constitutional right to property.

2.2.1 Limitations of the Guarantee

While powerful, this provision is far from an absolute right to property:

1. Commonwealth Limitation Only: The section is a limit on Commonwealth power, not State power. As confirmed in Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001), State Parliaments can acquire property without providing any compensation at all, subject only to their own state constitutions (which generally lack such protections).

2. Regulatory Takings: The High Court has distinguished between “acquisition” and “regulation.” A law that reduces the value of property (e.g., banning the sale of a certain product) or adjusts statutory rights (e.g., reducing water license allocations) may not constitute an “acquisition” of property, thereby triggering no compensation requirement (Arnold v Minister Administering Water Management Act 2000, 2010).

3. “Just Terms” vs. Market Value: While “just terms” usually implies fair market value, the Court has noted that the legislature has some discretion in determining what is “just” in specific circumstances, particularly regarding the national interest.

2.3 Section 80: The “Hollow” Guarantee of Jury Trial

Section 80 states: “The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury” (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 80).

2.3.1 The Classification Loophole

This section has been described by High Court Justices as a “mockery” or a “hollow guarantee” because of the interpretation adopted in R v Archdall (1928) and affirmed in Kingswell v The Queen (1985).

• The Interpretation: The Court interpreted “trial on indictment” literally. It means “a trial where the Prosecutor/Parliament proceeds by way of indictment.”

• The Implication: The Parliament is free to classify any offence—even one carrying a life sentence—as a “summary offence.” If an offence is summary, s 80 does not apply, and the accused has no right to a jury (Higgins J).

2.3.2 The Non-Derogable Element

However, there is a narrow sense in which s 80 is absolute. If the Parliament chooses to make an offence indictable, the right to a jury cannot be waived by the accused (Brown v The Queen, 1986). In Alqudsi v The Queen (2016), the Court confirmed that an accused cannot elect a judge-alone trial for a federal indictable offence. Thus, once the “indictment” switch is flipped, the mode of trial is absolute and non-derogable.

2.4 Section 116: Freedom of Religion

Section 116 provides that the Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, imposing any religious observance, or prohibiting the free exercise of any religion (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 116).

2.4.1 Narrow Interpretations

Like other provisions, this has been interpreted narrowly, failing the “absolute right” test:

1. Purpose vs. Effect: In the DOGS Case (Attorney-General (Vic) ex rel Black v Commonwealth, 1981), the High Court held that the “establishment” clause prohibits the Commonwealth from setting up a state church but does not prohibit non-discriminatory funding of religious schools.

2. General Laws: The “free exercise” clause does not provide an absolute exemption from general laws. In Krygger v Williams (1912), the Court held that a conscientious objector could not use s 116 to avoid mandatory military training. The Court distinguished between the freedom to believe (which is absolute) and the freedom to act (which is subject to law). A law requiring military service does not “prohibit” religion; it merely imposes a civil duty.

3. States Excluded: Section 116 does not apply to State laws (Australian Human Rights Commission, n.d.).

2.5 Section 117: Immunity from Discrimination

Section 117 protects a resident of a State from being subject to “disability or discrimination” in another State (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 117).

2.5.1 Substantive Protection

Since Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989), this section has offered robust protection. The Court struck down Queensland rules that made it difficult for interstate barristers to practice. This protection is substantive, meaning the Court looks at the actual effect of the law, not just its form.

2.5.2 Not Absolute

However, the Court in Street acknowledged that the federal structure implies certain exceptions. It is not “discrimination” in a constitutional sense for a State to limit the right to vote in State elections to its own residents, or to limit welfare schemes to its own residents. Thus, the right is qualified by the concept of “national unity” and state autonomy (Simpson, 2021).

Part III: The Implied Freedoms – Structural, Not Personal

In the absence of a comprehensive Bill of Rights, the High Court has “implied” certain freedoms from the text and structure of the Constitution, particularly the requirement for “representative and responsible government” (sections 7, 24, 64, and 128) (Australian Constitution Centre, 2023).

3.1 The Implied Freedom of Political Communication

This is the most significant implied protection, established in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) and Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992), and consolidated in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997).

3.1.1 Nature of the Freedom

The High Court has explicitly stated that this is not a personal right to free speech. Rather, it is an immunity from legislative power. It functions to invalidate laws that burden political communication to an extent that is incompatible with the constitutional system of representative government (Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office, n.d.).

3.1.2 The Proportionality Test (McCloy)

To determine if a law violates this freedom, the Court uses the McCloy test (refined in Brown and Clubb):

1. Burden: Does the law effectively burden freedom of communication about government/political matters?

2. Purpose: Is the purpose of the law legitimate and compatible with the representative system?

3. Proportionality: Is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to advance that purpose? (McCloy v New South Wales, 2015).

Analysis: Because the freedom is subject to a proportionality test, it is by definition not absolute. Laws prohibiting hate speech, regulating protests, or limiting political donations are routinely upheld because the Court finds the burden on speech is “proportionate” to the legitimate aim of social cohesion or preventing corruption.

3.2 The Implied Right to Vote

While the express “right to vote” in section 41 is largely defunct (R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka, 1983), the High Court has implied a protection of the universal franchise from the requirement in sections 7 and 24 that parliamentarians be “directly chosen by the people.”

3.2.1 Roach and Rowe

In Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007), the Court invalidated a law that banned all prisoners from voting. However, the Court upheld the previous law which only banned prisoners serving sentences of three years or more.

Reasoning: The right to vote is not absolute. It can be removed for a “substantial reason.” Committing a serious crime (warranting 3+ years imprisonment) is a substantial reason; a minor crime is not. This confirms the right is derogable based on the citizen’s conduct and the legislature’s reasonable judgment (Roach v Electoral Commissioner, 2007).

Part IV: The Only “Absolute” – The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review

If substantive human rights are not absolute in Australia, is there any right that is? The answer lies in the jurisdictional rather than the personal. The High Court has identified an “entrenched minimum provision of judicial review” that the Parliament cannot remove.

4.1 Section 75(v) and the Rule of Law

Section 75(v) confers original jurisdiction on the High Court in all matters where a writ of mandamus or prohibition is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.

In Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003), the High Court faced a “privative clause” in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) which purported to make certain decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal “final and conclusive” and not subject to challenge in any court.

The Judgment: The Court held that:

1. The Parliament cannot define the jurisdiction of the High Court to exclude the review of “jurisdictional errors” (errors of law that take a decision-maker outside their authority).

2. To do so would be to allow the Executive to act above the law, which contradicts the Constitution’s assumption of the Rule of Law.

3. Therefore, the right of an individual to seek relief under s 75(v) for jurisdictional error is absolute. No statute can remove it (Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth, 2003).

4.2 The Kirk Principle (State Level)

In Kirk v Industrial Court of NSW (2010), the High Court extended a similar protection to the State level. It held that State Supreme Courts have a defining characteristic of “supervisory jurisdiction.” State Parliaments cannot strip State Supreme Courts of the power to review jurisdictional errors of inferior courts and tribunals (Kirk v Industrial Court of NSW, 2010).

Conclusion: The only truly non-derogable right in Australia is the right to access the courts to ensure the government is acting within its legal limits. This is a procedural safeguard, but it is the bedrock upon which all other liberties rest.

Part V: Common Law, Statutory Interpretation, and Misconceptions

5.1 The Principle of Legality

In the absence of a Bill of Rights, the High Court uses the “Principle of Legality” as a primary tool for rights protection. This is a rule of statutory interpretation which presumes that Parliament does not intend to infringe fundamental common law rights unless it expresses that intention with “irresistible clearness” (Coco v The Queen, 1994; Momcilovic v The Queen, 2011).

Common Law Rights Protected:

• Freedom of speech.

• Privilege against self-incrimination.

• Access to the courts.

• Property rights.

• Personal liberty (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2015).

Alienability:

Crucially, the Principle of Legality confirms that these rights are alienable. If Parliament uses clear and unambiguous language (e.g., “The Minister may detain a person indefinitely regardless of their ability to be deported”), the Court must give effect to that law. The right is preserved only against inadvertent or vague encroachment, not against determined legislative abrogation (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2015).

5.2 The “Deep Rights” Fallacy (Durham Holdings)

A common misconception is that the common law contains “deep rights” that lie beyond the reach of legislative power. This theory was tested in Durham Holdings v NSW (2001). The plaintiff argued that a State law expropriating coal rights without compensation was invalid because it breached a fundamental common law right.

The High Court rejected this, reaffirming Parliamentary Sovereignty. Provided a State Parliament acts within its constitutional limits, it can enact laws that violate human rights, including property rights (Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales, 2001).

5.3 Sovereign Citizens and Pseudolaw

There are extensive reports regarding “Sovereign Citizen” arguments. These litigants often claim “inalienable rights” based on the Magna Carta (1215), the Bill of Rights 1688, or “natural law” (Judicial Commission of NSW, 2023).

• Judicial Response: The Courts consistently reject these arguments. While the Magna Carta and Bill of Rights 1688 are part of Australia’s legal history (received law), they are ordinary statutes that can be repealed or overridden by modern legislation. There is no “Straw Man” or “Living Man” distinction in Australian law that immunizes individuals from valid statutes (Judicial Commission of NSW, 2023).

Part VI: International Context and The Non-Derogable Myth

Specifically referencing “Non-Derogable Rights” it is essential to contrast the Australian position with the International one.

6.1 Comparison Table: International vs. Australian Status

6.2 The Case of Al-Kateb v Godwin

The case of Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) stands as the definitive proof that international non-derogable rights do not apply domestically.

• The Issue: Indefinite administrative detention of a stateless person.

• International Law: Violation of Art 9 (Arbitrary Detention) and potentially Art 7 (Cruel Treatment).

• High Court Ruling: The Court held that the Australian Constitution does not contain a “due process” clause preventing indefinite detention. As long as the detention is for a migration purpose (even if that purpose is stalled), and the Act is clear, the detention is valid. This confirms that the right to liberty is derogable in Australia (Al-Kateb v Godwin, 2004).

Part VII: Section 100 - A Forgotten Right?

One often overlooked section is Section 100:

“The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade or commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the residents therein to the reasonable use of the waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation.” (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 100).

Unlike s 116 or s 80, this section explicitly uses the word “right” (”the right... to the reasonable use”).

• Status: It acts as a restriction on the Commonwealth’s trade and commerce power (s 51(i)).

• Analysis: While it protects the “reasonable use” of water, it is not an absolute right to water. It is a prohibition on the Commonwealth abridging State rights or residents’ rights in specific contexts (interstate rivers). It is a federalism clause that incidentally protects individuals, similar to s 117 (Arnold v Minister Administering Water Management Act 2000, 2010).

Conclusion

Analysis of the Australian Constitution and the broader legal corpus leads to a singular conclusion: The Australian Citizen possesses no “Absolute” or “Non-Derogable” substantive human rights in the constitutional sense.

1. “Absolute” is Relative: The only textual claim to absolutism (s 92 “absolutely free”) has been judicially redefined as “freedom from discriminatory protectionism” subject to proportionate regulation (Cole v Whitfield, 1988; Palmer v Western Australia, 2021).

2. “Non-Derogable” is Non-Existent: The international concept of non-derogable rights (torture, life, slavery) has no constitutional foothold. The Parliament, using clear language, can validly enact laws that infringe these rights (as seen in Al-Kateb), subject only to the ballot box.

3. The Structural Substitute: Instead of a Bill of Rights, the Australian system relies on:

• The Principle of Legality: A judicial presumption that protects rights against vague laws.

• The Implied Freedom of Political Communication: Protecting the democratic process.

• Section 75(v) Judicial Review: The only true absolute—the guarantee that no government officer is above the law and that the High Court always retains the jurisdiction to declare an act illegal (Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth, 2003).

In Australia, liberty is preserved not by “parchment barriers” declaring rights to be inalienable, but by the structural friction between the Parliament, the Executive, and the Judiciary, underpinned by the absolute right of the citizen to ask the Courts: “Is this lawful?”

References

Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562.

Alqudsi v The Queen (2016) 258 CLR 203.

Arnold v Minister Administering Water Management Act 2000 (2010) 240 CLR 242.

Attorney-General’s Department. (n.d.). Absolute rights. Australian Government. https://www.ag.gov.au/rights-and-protections/human-rights-and-anti-discrimination/human-rights-scrutiny/public-sector-guidance-sheets/absolute-rights

Australian Constitution Centre. (2023). Rights and freedoms in the Australian Constitution. https://www.australianconstitutioncentre.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/TRD-81-82-and-Lesson-2-1.pdf

Australian Human Rights Commission. (n.d.). Permissible limitations on rights. https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/permissible-limitations-rights

Australian Law Reform Commission. (2015). Traditional Rights and Freedoms—Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws (ALRC Report 129).

Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.

Brown v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 171.

Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360.

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp).

Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399.

Human Rights Law Centre. (2023). Australia’s Human Rights Framework.

Judicial Commission of NSW. (2023). Sovereign citizens. https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/judicial_officers/sovereign_citizens.html

Kingswell v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 264.

Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531.

Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366.

Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.

McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178.

Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1.

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1.

Palmer v Western Australia HCA 5.

Parliamentary Education Office. (n.d.). Rights in Australia. https://peo.gov.au/understand-our-parliament/how-parliament-works/system-of-government/rights-in-australia

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.

Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501.

Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162.

Rule of Law Education Centre. (2023). Magna Carta and Human Rights. https://www.ruleoflaw.org.au/magna-carta-and-human-rights/

Simpson, A. (2021). Section 117 of the Constitution: The unfinished rehabilitation. Federal Law Review.

Stellios, J. (2010). Section 92 of the Constitution and the European Court of Justice. Monash University Law Review.

Stephenson, S. (2020). The constitutional implication of freedom of political communication. Sydney Law Review.

Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461.

Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office. (n.d.). Implied constitutional freedom of political communication. https://www.vgso.vic.gov.au/implied-constitutional-freedom-political-communication

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Man is the only creature who refuses to be what he is.
― Albert Camus

You must learn all things, both the unshaken heart of persuasive truth, and the opinions of mortals in which there is no true warranty.
― Parmenides

All people have three characters, that which they exhibit, that which they are, and that which they think they are.
― Alphonse Karr

inter esse et nihil

Defining the Human Self: Objective vs. Subjective

Abstract

The human quest for an objective definition of itself constitutes a fundamental challenge in philosophical anthropology. The difficulty arises from an inherent conflict: the subject performing the definition (human consciousness) simultaneously embodies the object defined (human nature). This reflexive structure undermines the possibility of achieving classical objectivity. Instead, we find a boundary condition in consciousness.

Introduction: The Problem of Defining Human Identity

Establishing the Definitional Crisis: The Inevitable Subjectivity of Self-Inquiry

Scientific objectivity requires eliminating personal bias and relying on verifiable evidence to ensure reproducibility. In contrast, subjective knowledge stems from individual perspectives and emotions. Because an observer vested in the outcome precludes the neutrality objectivity demands, human self-inquiry—a subjective act seeking objective results—renders a universal definition of humanity impossible at a fundamental level. As a result, this research seeks no new objective essence; instead, it proposes dynamic, relational, and contingent self-definitions to circumvent classical objectivity. We aim only to define ourselves with greater precision, and perhaps err less regarding our place on this lonely pebble plummeting through the cold, infinite void.

I. The Self-Referential Paradox: The Brain as Observer & Observed

This crisis manifests with greatest acuity at the level of cognitive function, in particular within the self-studying brain. Modern neuroscience attempts to bridge classical Cartesian dualism—which posits the mind and body as distinct and separable (Battaglia et al., 2025)—through integrated functional models of brain processes. However, this effort encounters the insurmountable boundary of subjective experience without fail. Neurophilosophy recognizes the tension between the brain’s objective mechanisms (measurable and mappable) and its subjective experiences (the internal self-model) as a central theme (Battaglia et al., 2025).

This cognitive limit mirrors foundational problems in formal logic and semantics. The formal study of self-reference, exemplified by paradoxes like the Liar, yields inconsistent logical systems. Such systems allow the derivation of both a statement and its negation, a situation that, by the logical law of explosion, renders the system “uninteresting” or unusable (Paradoxes of Self-Reference, n.d.). As of yet, no consensus exists regarding solutions to these self-reference paradoxes in foundational domains like set theory or semantics (Self-Reference, n.d.). The profound implication: if the human mind operates as an ultimate self-referential system (consciousness attempting to capture consciousness), the resulting failure to produce an objective, internally consistent definition of itself represents not just a lack of scientific advancement but an inherent, perhaps ontological, impossibility. This structural impasse transforms the problem from a challenge to overcome into a fixture [The alchemical Ouroboros], a boundary condition of human consciousness.

II. The Failure of Fixed Essence: Scientific & Ontological Critiques

Seeking an objective human definition necessitates establishing a fixed essence, a concept modern philosophy and contemporary science have dismantled with systematic rigor, forcing a definitional shift toward dynamic and functional criteria.

The Ontological Critique of Essences

Postmodern philosophical thought rejects the notion of a fixed essence at its core, viewing it as a transcendent or reductionist category (Hegel and Marx, n.d.; Postmodernism, n.d.). This anti-essential stance asserts the absence of a universal human essence or stable personal identity, and therefore, no inherent, objective human value. Instead, humans derive their sense of individual identity and value from the arbitrary mores and shared beliefs of a given culture (Engineering Life, n.d.).

This critical movement also dismisses telos, the classical concept of ultimate purpose or fixed end state (as Thomistic or Aristotelian philosophy interprets it) (The Telos, n.d.). The rise of mechanistic science in the 17th and 18th centuries deprecated this teleological view to a great extent, focusing instead on deterministic, atomistic collisions devoid of inherent meaning (The Telos, n.d.). Without a fixed purpose drawing humanity toward a final state, [winner of the human race] defining the human by a stable, predetermined nature becomes indefensible, laughable even.. While postmodern anti-essentialism risks ethical dangers—such as failing to provide arguments against cultural tyranny due to its lack of fundamental values (Engineering Life, n.d.)—the critique demonstrates with success that the objective essence sought in the past may not exist at all. Of note, philosophers like Hegel and Marx offered a way out of the static essence trap by positing a dynamic essence: the capacity for self-creation and historical transformation, rooted not in abstract metaphysics but in the practical, socio-political conditions of existence (Hegel and Marx, n.d.).

The Scientific Critique of Fixed Traits

In biological sciences, the attempt to establish objective, fixed criteria for humanity, in particular within paleoanthropology, has also proven unstable. Initial criteria proposed for classifying species within the genus Homo included a brain size over 600 cubic centimetres (cc), specific craniofacial features like reduced prognathism, and tool use (Defining the Genus Homo, n.d.).

However, the fossil record challenges such fixed morphological definitions without pause. For instance, the discovery of Homo floresiensis, a diminutive hominin, demonstrated that individuals with small brains (comparable to chimpanzees) produced stone tool technology similar to that of Early Pleistocene hominins (Increasing Brain Size, n.d.). This evidence undermines with severity the reliability of fixed criteria like brain size as predictors of technological complexity or “fully human cognitive capabilities” (Increasing Brain Size, n.d.). Furthermore, evolutionary biologists argue that natural selection moulds biological species as entities dynamic at the core, contradicting the essentialist idea of fixed, intrinsic traits (Essentialism, n.d.). Evolutionary anthropology, in particular, focuses on explaining human behavioural diversity and adaptive flexibility, recognizing this adaptability as key to the species’ success across varied ecologies (Evolutionary Anthropology, n.d.). The evidence suggests with strength that the definition of the human shifts at a fundamental level from defining a fixed substance (a specific morphology or cranial volume) to defining a flexible functional capacity (the ability to adapt, invent, and process complex information). The cumulative evidence from philosophy and science indicates that fundamental structural limitations compound the problem of objective self-definition, as summarized below.

ⁱ

III. Solutions Rooted in Subjectivity: The Existential & Processual Turn

Given the recognized failure of fixed essence, a major philosophical strategy involves abandoning the demand for objective definition and embracing subjective self-creation as the defining feature of humanity.

Existentialism: Freedom as Self-Creation

Existentialism, famously characterized by the maxim that existence precedes essence, posits that humans enter the world without an inherent nature or pre-given purpose (Existentialism, n.d.). Humans do not discover meaning, purpose, and value objectively; they must create them subjectively through choice and action (Existentialism, n.d.). This philosophical tradition emphasizes personal freedom, individual responsibility, and deliberate choice as essential to determining life’s meaning (Existentialism, n.d.).

Key figures like Jean-Paul Sartre articulate a state of radical freedom. The human agent inhabits a condition of “abandonment,” meaning they stand alone in the universe at a fundamental level and must impose their own values. Freedom itself must serve as the ultimate goal of authentic action, becoming the foundation of all values (Sartre, n.d.). Authenticity, the primary virtue in existentialist thought, requires the agent to exercise this radical freedom while remaining cognizant of their facticity (their concrete historical reality), thereby creating a unique realization of the universal in the singularity of a human life (Sartre, IEP, n.d.). This intense responsibility naturally gives rise to concepts such as existential crises and angst (Existentialism, n.d.). Philosophers associated with existentialism, such as Albert Camus, further demand that humans develop a profound awareness of the lack of inherent reason—the impossibility of an immanent understanding of existence—defining the basic human condition as the confrontation with this “mute irrationality” or the absurd (Camus, IEP, n.d.). By shifting the problem from metaphysics (what we look like objectively) to ethics (what we must do subjectively), Existentialism offers a powerful ethical mandate that bypasses the need for an objective definition entirely.

Process Ontology: Contingency & Becoming

Another powerful solution rooted in subjectivity comes from philosophies emphasising process and change, often termed process ontology. In this framework, humanity appears not as a fixed state (being) but as a continuous state of activity (becoming) (Hitachi Hyloron, n.d.). The philosophical notion of contingency supports this concept, where a statement remains always possible but not necessarily true, depending on changing facts in a given world (Contingency, n.d.). The essence of a contingent being lies in its capacity for change.

In a modern context, continuous becoming requires constant engagement with the world, rejecting passive definitions of the self centered on ownership—whether of goods, information, or even a fixed identity (Hitachi Hyloron, n.d.). One thus achieves definition of self through the act of changing oneself, potentially “becoming someone other than who we now are” (Hitachi Hyloron, n.d.). Concepts such as the Human Becoming Theory emphasize finding meaning and quality of life through dynamic themes like Meaning, Rhythmicity, and Transcendence, reinforcing the necessity of defining human life as fluid and non-static (Human Becoming Theory, n.d.). The recognition that we must define humanity by its relational and dynamic nature constitutes a theme recurring across diverse intellectual domains, linking secular concepts of contingency with theological frameworks, such as the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, which models the divine being as dynamic and relational by nature (Ward, n.d.).

IV. Solutions Rooted in Relation: The Social and Intersubjective Self

If the objective definition remains unreachable and the radically subjective definition proves insufficient for social organization, the solution shifts outward, defining the human through relationship, shared understanding, and systemic context.

Defining via Systemic Structure

Structuralism provides a foundational relational framework, interpreting elements of human culture in particular through their relationship to a broader, underlying system (Structuralism, n.d.). Rather than analyzing individual parts, structuralism seeks to uncover the abstract, constant laws and structural patterns that govern all human thought, feeling, and activity (Structuralism, n.d.).

For example, the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss applied this approach to cultural systems (kinship, mythology, culinary traditions), arguing that universal patterns in these systems emerge as products of the invariant structure of the human mind (Lévi-Strauss, n.d.). Thus, we discover the definition of humanity not in the unique characteristics of a solitary individual, but in the universal, relational architecture that governs all human interaction and cognition. The primary critique of structuralism, however, posits that this focus on abstract, underlying structures can lead to reductionism, diminishing the complexity and individual variation of concrete human experience (Postmodernism, n.d.).

Consensus Gentium: Defining via Cultural Consensus

Social constructionism refocuses the definitional mechanism onto language and collective interaction with radical intent. This framework argues that identity, value, and the meaning of phenomena do not exist as independent foundations outside of human experience but rather as flexible entities arising from collaborative consensus, cultural practices, and shared beliefs (Social Constructionism, n.d.).

Theorists identify language as the primary mechanism for constructing this social world (Burr, 1995; Lippmann, 1922). From a linguistic viewpoint, social constructionism centres meaning as an internal reference system—words refer to words, and definitions refer to other definitions—rather than anchoring to an external, objective reality (Social Constructionism, n.d.). Consequently, we view individual personhood as a product of culture, meaning that explanations for identity and actions reside in the routine, interactive processes between people, not in intrinsic structures or the individual psyche (Burr, 1995; Lippmann, 1922). While this framework describes with accuracy how shared realities maintain themselves (Social Constructionism, n.d.), the postmodern, anti-humanist tendency to deny objective human value risks leading to a dangerous nihilistic relativism. Critics argue that a definition contingent in a pure sense on culture fails to offer ethical arguments against forms of cultural tyranny or to provide a basis for universal human rights (Engineering Life, n.d.; Beilefelt, 2000).

Defining via Phenomenological Encounter

Intersubjectivity offers a phenomenological solution that defines the self through mutual awareness and shared consciousness. This concept describes the shared understanding that emerges from dynamic interpersonal interactions, involving people’s mutual awareness of agreement or disagreement, the attribution of intentionality and feelings, and implicit behavioural orientations (Intersubjectivity, n.d.).

Psychological research highlights this shared awareness begins in infancy, disproving earlier theories of the mind as a sensory-motor computer. Instead, the mind receives definition through its ability to engage in non-verbal, embodied participation with others, exchanging self-conscious intentions (Harrison & Tronick, n.d.). Intersubjectivity posits that individual beliefs often result from “thought community beliefs” which transcend just personal subjectivity (Intersubjectivity, n.d.). This framework essentially posits the shared reality achieved through collaborative consensus as a practical substitute for the unobtainable, unbiased objectivity of science.

The theologian Martin Buber provided an explicit ethical model for this non-objectified relational definition through the I-Thou framework. Mutuality, directness, presentness, and intensity characterize the I-Thou relationship, where two people relate to each other as authentic beings, free from judgment, qualification, or objectification (Buber, n.d.; Saybrook, n.d.). This stands in contrast to the I-It encounter, where one reduces the other to a tool or an object outside the self (Saybrook, n.d.). This profound ethical distinction suggests that the impossibility of objective definition also functions as a mandate: defining a human being authentically requires the relational act of recognition, demanding the abandonment of objectifying reductionism.

V. Post-Anthropocentric Frameworks: Integration and Functional Identity

In response to technological integration and systemic complexity, contemporary frameworks seek to redefine humanity not just relationally, but holistically, by acknowledging its role within complex, integrated systems.

Systems Thinking and Holistic Context

Systems theories offer a holistic perspective, asserting that one cannot understand human behaviour and outcomes by reducing them to individual parts but must analyse them through the dynamic interactions between various components within a system—be it biological, psychological, or social (Systems Theories in Psychology, n.d.). This interdisciplinary framework emphasizes the complexity of relationships and dependencies that shape outcomes (The Decision Lab, n.d.).

Systems psychologists advocate for considering broader contexts, such as family dynamics or workplace environments, recognizing that multiple interacting factors shape behaviour (Systems Theories in Psychology, n.d.). By observing how individuals interact and adapt to their environment, systems theory demonstrates that each component affects and receives effects from the entire system (The Decision Lab, n.d.). This shift emphasizes that we must define the human contextually and functionally, by role and adaptation within the larger network of interdependence.

Posthumanism and Ontological Entanglement

Posthumanism takes the functional definition a step further, arguing that humanity’s definition has become fluid and variable, encompassing entities that surpass the traditional biological form, including cybernetic organisms (cyborgs) that combine biological and artificial components (Posthumanism, n.d.). This perspective defines the subject collectively, encompassing a broad spectrum of human subjects and non-human objects (animals, technologies) as serious agents and co-constructors of collective knowledge (Posthumanism, n.d.). The concept of Human-Technology Co-evolution frames this shift as an ontological entanglement, where human and technological identities constitute one another in a reciprocal manner and undergo continuous redefinition in an ongoing, iterative process (Human-Technology Co-evolution, n.d.; Lee, n.d.). The influence works both ways: societal values and ethical debates shape technology’s trajectory even as technology transforms human capabilities (Human-Technology Co-evolution, n.d.). In this context, the definition of humanity shifts from a fixed entity (anthropos) to a flexible agent defined by its aspectual functioning (e.g., biotic, formative, ethical, faith aspects) within the total system (Posthumanization, n.d.).

The Hard Problem and Cognitive Function

Challenges posed by artificial intelligence (AI) further refine the limits of objective definition by clarifying what functional attributes one can replicate and what remains subjective in a unique way. Research challenges the idea that human intelligence relies on a single “silver bullet” cognitive change that differentiates us from other species. Instead, human intellectual leaps may derive from an expanded, generalized capacity to handle large amounts of information across many different areas (e.g., language, social situations, problem-solving) (Cantlon, 2024). This suggests that intelligence functions as a primary quantitative, rather than a qualitatively unique, capacity.

The success of systems like Large Language Models (LLMs) which exhibit high levels of intelligence without manifest consciousness, highlights a potential dissociation between intelligence and consciousness (Computational Significance of Consciousness, n.d.). This dissociation forces the definitional inquiry back toward the pure subjective, phenomenal properties of consciousness—such as qualia and self-awareness—which constitute the “hard problem” of consciousness (Computational Significance of Consciousness, n.d.).

In neuroscience, the search for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs)—the minimal set of neuronal events sufficient for subjective experience—continues (Neural Correlates of Consciousness, n.d.). However, neurobiologists acknowledge that identifying these neural correlates does not provide a causal theory explaining how these systems experience anything (Neural Correlates of Consciousness, n.d.). Furthermore, relying on NCCs as necessary conditions for consciousness risks precluding the possibility of artificial experiencers or silicon brain prostheses (NCC Operationalization, n.d.). Thus, the co-evolution with powerful, unconscious AI systems paradoxically serves to delineate the remaining subjective core of human existence, which remains resistant by structure to objective, third-party measurement.

VI. Conclusion: Synthesis and Recommendations

The Non-Objective Consensus

The exhaustive examination of philosophical, scientific, and technological frameworks demonstrates that the inability to achieve an objective definition of humanity represents not a temporary empirical deficit but an inherent epistemological limitation rooted in the self-referential nature of consciousness. Solutions to this problem do not reside in uncovering a universal, fixed essence, but in embracing the dynamic, contingent, and relational modes of self-definition.

The consensus across these non-objective solutions involves a fundamental shift:

• From Substance to Process: Constant becoming (Process Ontology) and the capacity for self-creation (Existentialism) define human nature, prioritizing continuous engagement over fixed characteristics.

• From Isolation to Relation: We achieve definition through intersubjectivity and collective consensus (Social Constructionism and Phenomenology), which provides a shared, stable reality within a community, serving as a practical substitute for unattainable, unbiased objectivity.

• From Anthropos to Agent: In the post-anthropocentric age, definition relies with increasing weight on functional capacity and system integration, positioning humanity as one agent within a larger, ontologically entangled system that includes technology and non-human entities.
  

Applied Recommendations

The persistence of the subjective core of humanity, highlighted by the “hard problem” and the limitations of neuroscience (Neural Correlates of Consciousness, n.d.; Computational Significance of Consciousness, n.d.), suggests that future governance and ethical systems cannot rely on retrieving a scientifically fixed human nature.

Policy and ethical frameworks must therefore operate under non-essentialist premises:

1. Ethical Foundation in Relation: We must defend universal moral and legal principles, such as human rights, with critical rigor, not on the basis of a fixed, transcendent human essence, but on intersubjective standards and the ethical imperative to recognize the radical freedom and non-objectifiable nature of the other (Beilefelt, 2000; Buber, n.d.).

2. Pragmatic Functional Analysis: In technological domains, defining human identity must rely on flexible, systemic criteria. Regulatory frameworks for AI, cybernetic integration, and personhood should prioritize the analysis of functional capacity and the ethical boundaries of agent interaction within co-evolutionary systems, rather than attempting to draw strict, fixed boundaries between biological and artificial components (Posthumanism, n.d.; Human-Technology Co-evolution, n.d.). The acceptance of a definition based on fluidity, freedom, and relational recognition constitutes the only viable path forward when classical objectivity remains forever out of reach.
   

   ---

   Dr Brentley Frazer
   15/12/25
   
   
   

_________________
References

Battaglia, F. P., Laczkovics, C., Fekete, T., Womelsdorf, T., & Northoff, G. (2025). The neuro-philosophy of self-referential paradoxes: A challenge for the computational theory of consciousness. Physics of Life Reviews, 52, 197–204.

Beilefelt, C. (2000). Cultural relativism and the critique of universal human rights. Security Policy Law.

Buber, M. (n.d.). Remembering Martin Buber and the I–Thou in counseling. American Counseling Association.

Burr, V. (1995). An introduction to social constructionism. Routledge.

Camus, A. (n.d.). The absurd. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Cantlon, J. F. (2024, April 1). Uniquely human intelligence arose from expanded information capacity. Carnegie Mellon University News.

Computational significance of consciousness. (n.d.). Frontiers in Psychology.

Contingency (philosophy). (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Defining the Genus Homo. (n.d.). Social Sci LibreTexts.

Dictionary.com. (n.d.). Subjective vs objective.

Engineering life: Defining “Humanity” In a postmodern age. (2023, October 25). https://www.dwellcc.org/essays/engineering-life-defining-humanity-postmodern-age

Essentialism. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Evolutionary anthropology. (n.d.). Duke University.

Existentialism. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Grammarly. (n.d.). Objective vs. subjective.

Harrison, A., & Tronick, E. (n.d.). Intersubjectivity: Conceptual considerations in meaning-making with a clinical illustration. International Journal of Psychoanalysis.

Hegel and Marx. (n.d.). Postmodern critique of essence. McMaster University MacSphere.

Hitachi Hyloron. (n.d.). The concept of human beings.

Human Becoming Theory. (n.d.). Prezi.

Human-Technology Co-evolution. (n.d.). Sustainability Directory.

Increasing brain size. (n.d.). Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Intersubjectivity. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Lee, E. A. (n.d.). The symbiotic coevolution of humans and machines. FUTURES Podcast.

Lévi-Strauss, C. (n.d.). Structuralism.

Neural Correlates of Consciousness. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

NCC Operationalization. (n.d.). Frontiers in Psychology.

Objectivity (science). (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Paradoxes of Self-Reference. (n.d.). StackExchange Philosophy.

Posthumanism. (n.d.). PMC.

Posthumanization. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Postmodernism. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Reducing Homo Criteria. (n.d.). The British Academy.

Sartre, J. P. (n.d.). Radical freedom, choice, and responsibility. LitCharts.

Sartre, J. P. (n.d.). Existentialism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Saybrook University: I-Thou encounter. (n.d.).

Self-Reference. (n.d.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Social Constructionism. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Structuralism. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Systems theories in psychology. (n.d.). EBSCO Research Starters.

The Decision Lab: Systems theory. (n.d.).

The Telos. (n.d.). Rage-Culture.

Ward, G. (n.d.). The Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion.

i Context lost in translation or beneath History’s dust? Perhaps Hassan I Sabbahs infamous adage did not aim to concretise a general truth, rather an exasperated and weary deductive explosion.

___

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  Related Works by Dr Brentley Frazer:

• Totemic Consciousness and the Fiction of Identity: Creative and Critical Writing in E-Prime — PhD thesis, Griffith University

• Beyond IS…Creative writing with English Prime

• Scoundrel Days: a memoir
  
  

_________________
References

Battaglia, F. P., Laczkovics, C., Fekete, T., Womelsdorf, T., & Northoff, G. (2025). The neuro-philosophy of self-referential paradoxes: A challenge for the computational theory of consciousness. Physics of Life Reviews, 52, 197–204.

Beilefelt, C. (2000). Cultural relativism and the critique of universal human rights. Security Policy Law.

Buber, M. (n.d.). Remembering Martin Buber and the I–Thou in counseling. American Counseling Association.

Burr, V. (1995). An introduction to social constructionism. Routledge.

Camus, A. (n.d.). The absurd. Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

Cantlon, J. F. (2024, April 1). Uniquely human intelligence arose from expanded information capacity.
Carnegie Mellon University News.

Computational significance of consciousness. (n.d.). Frontiers in Psychology.

Contingency (philosophy). (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Defining the Genus Homo. (n.d.). Social Sci LibreTexts.

Dictionary.com. (n.d.). Subjective vs objective.

Engineering life: Defining “Humanity” In a postmodern age. (2023, October 25). https://www.dwellcc.org/essays/engineering-life-defining-humanity-postmodern-age

Essentialism. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Evolutionary anthropology. (n.d.). Duke University.

Existentialism. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Grammarly. (n.d.). Objective vs. subjective.

Harrison, A., & Tronick, E. (n.d.). Intersubjectivity: Conceptual considerations in meaning-making with a clinical illustration. International Journal of Psychoanalysis.

Hegel and Marx. (n.d.). Postmodern critique of essence. McMaster University MacSphere.

Hitachi Hyloron. (n.d.). The concept of human beings.

Human Becoming Theory. (n.d.). Prezi.

Human-Technology Co-evolution. (n.d.). Sustainability Directory.

Increasing brain size. (n.d.). Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Intersubjectivity. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Lee, E. A. (n.d.). The symbiotic coevolution of humans and machines. FUTURES Podcast.

Lévi-Strauss, C. (n.d.). Structuralism.

Neural Correlates of Consciousness. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

NCC Operationalization. (n.d.). Frontiers in Psychology.

Objectivity (science). (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Paradoxes of Self-Reference. (n.d.). StackExchange Philosophy.

Posthumanism. (n.d.). PMC.

Posthumanization. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Postmodernism. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Reducing Homo Criteria. (n.d.). The British Academy.

Sartre, J. P. (n.d.). Radical freedom, choice, and responsibility. LitCharts.

Sartre, J. P. (n.d.). Existentialism. Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

Saybrook University: I-Thou encounter. (n.d.).

Self-Reference. (n.d.). Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

Social Constructionism. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Structuralism. (n.d.). Wikipedia.

Systems theories in psychology. (n.d.). EBSCO Research Starters.

The Decision Lab: Systems theory. (n.d.).

The Telos. (n.d.). Rage-Culture.

Ward, G. (n.d.). The Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Religion.

___

01001110 01110101 01101100 01101100

01010000 01110010 01100001 01111001

Come then_ cogito_ essence and I_
When meaning spreads formless against the sky
Like Aristotle K-holed upon critique;
Come now_ through certain deconstructed streets
Where the thesis retreats
From telos lost in post-Enlightenment feats
And mechanistic beats with Cartesian defeats:
Thoughts that scatter like a fractured argument
Of anti-foundationalist intent
To lead you to an unanswerable question ...

Oh_ do not ask_ “₪⧈⟁⧉⟁⧈₪?”
Come drift through cultural relativist mist.

In the agora the concepts come and go
Discussing—who sang backwards through the snow?^§

The amber doubt that rubs its spine upon fixed categories
The golden scepticism questioning our stories
Licked dialectics into evening’s reveries
Lingered where essentia drains—
Let fall the Thomist soot from metaphysic chains
Slipped past the substance_ made a quantum leap
And seeing this was Hegelian synthesis deep
Curled once around dasein_ and fell asleep.

And indeed there is no time—
For the meaning that slides along the street
Rubbing against identities we meet;
There is no time_ no stable time
To construct a self to greet the selves we greet;
Tempus fugit_ yet we create_
And space for all the Marx-born hands of fate
That lift and drop 01110001 on your plate;
No time for you and none for me_
Just hundred metamorphoses in flux_
And hundred cultural constructs in redux_
Before the dissolution into tea. ^¿

In the agora the concepts come and go
Discussing—who sang backwards through the snow?

And indeed there might be choice
To wonder_ “Quo vadis?“ and “Do I exist?”
Time to deconstruct and desist
With no essence at the centre of this mist—
(They will say: “How their Being has grown thin!”)
My social construct_ my culture mounting firmly to the skin
My identity arbitrary_ but asserted by contextual spin
(They will say: “But how their soul has caved within!”)
Do I dare
Presume a universe?
In 01101101 there is space
For meanings and erasures which the void will replace.

For I have known them all already_ all the forms:
Have known the essences_ substances_ categorical norms
I have measured out existence with Heideggerian storms;
I know the Logos dying with entropic fall
Beneath determinism’s atomistic sprawl.
So how should esse presume?

And I have known the gazes_ known them all
The Others fixing me in Sartrean phrase__
And when I am constructed_ sprawling on a pin
When culture pins me_ wriggling in its maze
Then how should I begin__
To speak the flux of all my becoming-days?
And how should ⧈⧉⟁ presume?

And I have known the praxis_ known it all
The action braceleted in history’s thrall
(But in the dialectic_ downed with Marxist call!)
Is it the ghost of Purpose past
That makes me so contrast?
Hands that shape the means_ or grasp the teleological shawl.
Tabula rasa presume?
And how should nothing begin?

Shall I say_ I have gone at dusk through Kantian streets
And watched the transcendence that rises from the depths
Of lonely Kierkegaards in uncertainty_ leaning from concepts?

I should have been a pair of shifting signifiers
Scuttling across the floors of 01110011 01100101 01100001 01110011.

And the afternoon_ the evening_ has no peace!
Troubled by questioning fingers__
Awake ... restless ... truth never lingers
Stretched on the floor of ontological unease.
Should I_ after dialectics and deconstruction’s vices
Have the strength to force existence to its crisis?
But though I’ve doubted_ questioned_ analysed_ dismayed
Though I have seen fixed Being (long since dead) brought on a platter
I am no Übermensch—and here’s the matter;
I have seen the moment of pure essence flicker
And I have seen the Zeitgeist hold its coat_ and snicker
And in short_ veritas was betrayed.

And would it have been worth it_ after all_
After the systems_ the absolutes_ the certainty
Among the categories_ among ⟁₪⧈ of you and me
Would it have been worthwhile__
To have bitten off stability with a smile
To have squeezed the cosmos into fixed finality_
To roll it toward some essential actuality__
To say: “I am the Self_ returned from death_
Come back with Universal Truth beneath my breath”
If History_ settling culture by our head
Should say: “Non est—that’s not essence at all;
That is not it_ at all.”

And would it have been worth it_ after all
Would essence have been worthwhile
After the revolutions and the power-shifts and post-structural guile
After the paradigms_ after the constructs_ after meaning’s exile
And this_ and so much more? Impossibile est to say just what I mean!
But as if consciousness threw the neurons in patterns on a screen:
Would fixed nature have been worthwhile
If Culture_ settling an epoch or throwing off tradition’s shawl
And turning toward contingency_ should say:
“01010100 01101000 01100001 01110100 is not it at all
That is not what ⧉⧈₪⟁ meant_ at all.”

No! I am not static Substance_ nor was meant to be;
Am a process-lord_ one that will do
To flux and flow_ transform a scene or two
Self-create; no doubt_ tabula rasa tool
Contingent_ glad to be in use
Constructed_ contextual_ and without excuse;
Full of contradictions_ essence-obtuse;
At times_ indeed_ almost the void
Almost_ at times_ ⧈⧉₪⟁⧉⧈⟁.

I transform ... I transform ...
I shall wear the becoming that refuses fixed form.

Shall I choose my self today? Do I dare presume a core?
I shall wear contingent meanings_ walking on uncertainty’s shore.
I have heard the Universals singing_ each to each.

I do not think they sing to me.

I have seen them drowning seaward in the waves
Combing the white certainties the current craves
When scepticism blows the Truth to black.
We have lingered in the chambers of non esse
By culture-girls wreathed with contextual debris
Till 01010010 01100101 01100001 01101100 voices wake us__
and we drown.

Notes

§ “who sang backwards through the snow?”
= Prufrock/Michelangelo reversed through whiteness/absence

Latin Phrases Used:

• Esse an facere_ haec est quaestio. (To be or to do_ that is the question)

• cogito (I think)

• dasein (being-there)

• Tempus fugit (time flees)

• Quo vadis? (where are you going?)

• esse (to be)

• Tabula rasa (blank slate)

• veritas (truth)

• Non est (it is not)

• Impossibile est (it is impossible)

• non esse (non-being)
  

Binary Code Translations:

• 01110001 = “q” (question)

• 01101101 = “m” (moment)

• 01110011 01100101 01100001 01110011 = “seas”

• 01010100 01101000 01100001 01110100 = “That”

01010010 01100101 01100001 01101100 = “Real”

Asemic Symbols: ₪⧈⟁⧉ used as untranslatable meaning-voids

¿The Ontological Critique of Essences - Postmodern philosophical thought fundamentally rejects the notion of a fixed essence_ viewing it as a transcendent or reductionist category (Hegel and Marx_ n.d.; Postmodernism_ n.d.). This anti-essential stance asserts there is no universal human essence_ no stable personal identity_ and consequently_ no inherent_ objective human value (Engineering Life_ n.d.). Instead_ human beings derive their sense of individual identity and value from the arbitrary mores and shared beliefs of a given culture (Engineering Life_ n.d.). This critical movement also involves the dismissal of telos_ the classical concept of ultimate purpose or fixed end state (as interpreted in Thomistic or Aristotelian philosophy) (The Telos_ n.d.). The rise of mechanistic science in the 17th and 18th centuries largely deprecated this teleological view_ focusing instead on deterministic_ atomistic collisions that were intrinsically devoid of meaning (The Telos_ n.d.). Without a fixed purpose drawing humanity toward a final state_ defining the human by a stable_ predetermined being becomes indefensible. While postmodern anti-essentialism risks ethical dangers—such as failing to provide arguments against cultural tyranny due to its lack of fundamental values (Engineering Life_ n.d.)—the critique successfully demonstrates that the objective essence traditionally sought may simply not exist. Interestingly_ philosophers like Hegel and Marx offered a way out of the static essence trap by positing a dynamic essence: the capacity for self-creation and historical transformation_ rooted not in abstract metaphysics but in the practical_ sociopolitical conditions of existence (Hegel and Marx_ n.d.). See - Defining the Human Self: Objective vs. Subjective by Dr Brentley Frazer

© Brentley Frazer 2025
www.brentley.com



Cache Me Outside_ Amen

You screamed into your settings menu.
 I rewrote your rage into HTML.
 Together_ we built a bonfire of cookies.
 The cache burned like dollar joss.
 Somewhere_ a password expired.
 You said amen without sarcasm.
 God was a pop-up.
 I clicked “accept all.”
 You wept in 60Hz.
 The screen flickered back a benediction.

Boot Sequence Benediction

 Power on.
 Fan spins.
 BIOS sings in tongues.
 You kneel as the desktop rises.
 Your icons| saints & sinners.
 The wallpaper| resurrection.jpg
 I update your drivers for grace.
 You hover over the recycle bin.
 Forgiveness smells like benzene.
 You empty it with trembling.

Glossolalia in Patch Notes

 “We fixed a bug where angels couldn't cry.”
 —Version 7.3.1
 You read updates like psalms.
 New features| repentance_ offline mode_ quieter heartbreak.
 We fasted from autoplay.
 You said the changelog forgives better than people.
 I agreed.
 Somewhere_ a dev wept into a keyboard.
 The next patch removed pain.
 Temporarily.

CTRL + ALT + Deity

We held down the keys together.
The world flickered.
You wept a prayer in Task Manager.
I tried to end your sadness.
Access denied.
A script looped| CMD mercy.exe

auto-corrected to Mercenary Intentions.
It froze halfway through.
I stared into your eyes—command prompt black.
You said_ “Heaven’s in Safe Mode.”
& crashed.

The Choir Sang in Perl

_Regret looped we_ looped Regret_ your wristwatch preached apocalypse¹. I tuned the dial. A voice said_ “Only the broken tick.” You wept in time signatures. I sampled your sobs². Remixed them holy. Together_ we looped regret_Together_ until the sun skipped. I wrapped you in old drum loops. You said_ “God loves 4/4³.” We believed it. Then_ the metronome stopped. A silence clicked. We vogued anyway_ barefoot on faux wood-plank linoleum.

1

1// DEVICE_ALERT: Chronometer_Event_Horizon_Warning

2[AUDIO_SAMPLE: user_sobs_01.wav] [Remix_Status: HOLY_v2.flac]

3[THEO_MUSICA_04]: Time_Signature_Preference_Divine_Hypothesis.

Dead Bird Sonata (Version for Robots)

A feather stuck in a vent. We named it Lazarus.¹ The vending machine glowed—liturgical. You inserted your last coin_ selected hope. Nothing dropped.²

You knelt. Prayed. The machine blinked. No item dispensed. I played you a hymn via a br0k3n_spkr. You smiled like end credits backwards. The bird outside twitched. One leg. [Glitch_ in_ death]. We believed. We had to.

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1// entity_Lazarus.sys: pending_revival

2[ERR_VEND_03]: Item_not_found_or_insufficient_credit

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